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Abstract
This paper investigates the relation between three different notions of privacy: identifiability, dif-
ferential privacy and mutual-information privacy. Under a unified privacy–distortion framework, where
the distortion is defined to be the expected Hamming distance between the input and output databases,
we establish some fundamental connections between these three privacy notions. Given a maximum
distortion D, define ∗i (D) to be the smallest (best) identifiability level, and 
∗
d(D) to be the smallest
differential privacy level. We characterize ∗i (D) and 
∗
d(D), and prove that 
∗
i (D)− X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D)
for D in some range, where X is a constant depending on the distribution of the original database X,
and diminishes to zero when the distribution of X is uniform. Furthermore, we show that identifia-
bility and mutual-information privacy are consistent in the sense that given a maximum distortion D
in some range, there is a mechanism that optimizes the identifiability level and also achieves the best
mutual-information privacy.
1 Introduction
Privacy has been an increasing concern in the emerging big data era, particularly with the growing use
of personal data such as medical records or online activities for big data analysis. Analyzing these data
results in new discoveries in science and engineering, but also puts individual’s privacy at potential risks.
Therefore, privacy-preserving data analysis, where the goal is to preserve the accuracy of data analysis
while maintaining individual’s privacy, has become one of the main challenges of this big data era. The
basic idea of privacy-preserving data analysis is to add randomness in the released information to guarantee
that an individual’s information cannot be inferred. Intuitively, the higher the randomness is, the better
privacy protection individual users get, but the less accurate (useful) the output statistical information is.
While randomization seems to be inevitable, for the privacy-preserving data analysis it is of great interest to
quantitatively define the notion of privacy. Specifically, we need to understand the amount of randomness
needed to protect privacy while preserving usefulness of the data. To this end, we consider three different
notions: identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy, where identifiability is concerned
with the posteriors of recovering the original data from the released data, differential privacy is concerned
with the additional information leakage of an individual due to the release of the data, and mutual information
measures the amount of information about the original database contained in the released data.
While these three different privacy notions are defined from different perspectives, they are fundamentally
related. The focus of this paper is to investigate the fundamental connections between these three different
privacy notions in the following setting:
• We consider the non-interactive database releasing approach for privacy-preserving data analysis, where
a synthetic database is released to the public. The synthetic database is a sanitized version of the
original database, on which queries and operations can be carried out as if it was the original database.
It is then natural to assume that the synthetic database and the original database are in the same
universe so the entries have the same interpretation. Therefore we focus on mechanisms that map
∗The authors are with the School of Electrical, Computer and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ
85281, USA (e-mail: {weina.wang, lei.ying.2, junshan.zhang}@asu.edu).
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Figure 1: Relation between identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-information privacy.
an input database to an output synthetic database in the same universe. Specifically, we consider a
database consisting of n rows, each of which takes values from a finite domain D of size m. In this
paper, the database is modeled as a discrete random variable X drawn from Dn with distribution pX .
A mechanism M is a mapping from an input database X to an output database Y , which is also a
random variable with alphabet Dn.
• We define the distortion between the output database and the input database to be the expected
Hamming distance. 1 When the input and output are in the same universe, the Hamming distance
measures the number of rows two databases differ on, which directly points to the number of rows that
need to be modified in order to guarantee a given privacy level.
In this paper, we use a unified privacy–distortion framework to understand the relation between the
three privacy notions. Define the privacy–distortion function to be the best privacy level given a distortion
constraint. Then we have the following main results, which are also summarized in Figure 1.
(i) We derive the exact form of the privacy–distortion function ∗i (D) under the notion of identifiability,
for some range of the distortion values, by showing that ∗i (D) = h
−1(D) regardless of the prior
distribution, where
h−1(D) = ln
( n
D
− 1)+ ln(m− 1).
We further show that for the privacy–distortion function ∗d(D) under the notion of differential privacy,
∗i (D)− X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D),
where X is a constant depending on the distribution of X only, given by
X = max
x,x′∈Dn:x∼x′
ln
pX(x)
pX(x′)
.
When the input database has a uniform distribution, we have that ∗i = 
∗
d, i.e., differential privacy
is equivalent to identifiability. Note that for X to be finite, the distribution pX needs to have full
a support on Dn, i.e., pX(x) > 0 for any x ∈ Dn. When X is large, differential privacy provides
only weak guarantee on identifiability. In other words, it is possible to identify some entries of the
database with non-trivial accuracy even if the differential privacy is guaranteed when X is large. This is
because differential privacy provides a relative privacy guarantee, which ensures that limited additional
information of an individual is leaked in the released data in addition to the knowledge that an adversary
has known. Identifiability, on the other hand, guarantees an absolute level of indistinguishability of
neighboring databases when being inferred from the output database assuming the distribution of pX
and the mechanism are both known to the adversary.
(ii) Given a maximum distortion D in some range, there is a mechanism that minimizes the identifiability
level and also minimizes the mutual information between X and Y . In other words, identifiability and
1Our study of more general distortion measures is underway.
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mutual-information privacy are consistent under the setting studied in this paper. This is somewhat
surprising since identifiability imposes constraints on the distributions of neighboring input databases,
which are “local” requirements; whereas the mutual information quantifies the correlation strength
between the input database and the output database, which is a “global” measure. While the two
notions are not directly comparable, the fact that they can be optimized simultaneously in the setting
studied in this paper reveals the fundamental connection between these two privacy notions.
1.1 Related Work
Differential privacy, as an analytical foundation for privacy-preserving data analysis, was developed by a line
of work (see, e.g., [1–3]). Dwork et al. [1] proposed the Laplace mechanism which adds Laplace noise to each
query result, with noise amplitude proportional to the global sensitivity of the query function. Nissim et
al. [4] later generalize the mechanism using the concept of local sensitivity. The notion of (, δ)-differential
privacy [3] has also been proposed as a relaxation of -differential privacy.
The existing research of differential privacy can be largely classified into two categories: the interactive
model where the randomness is added to the result of a query; and the non-interactive model, where the
randomness is added to the database before queried. Under the interactive model, a significant body of
work has been devoted to privacy–usefulness tradeoff and differentially private mechanisms with accuracy
guarantee on each query result have been developed (see, e.g., [5–8]). Since the interactive model allows only
a limited number of queries to be answered before the privacy is breached, researchers have also studied the
non-interactive model, where synthetic databases or contingency tables with differential privacy guarantees
were generated. Mechanisms with distortion guarantee for a set of queries to be answered using the synthetic
database have been developed (see, e.g., [9–13]).
Arising from legal definitions of privacy, identifiability has also been considered as a notion of privacy. Lee
and Clifton [14] and Li et al. [15] proposed differential identifiability and membership privacy, respectively.
Mutual information as a measure of privacy leakage has been widely used in the literature (see, e.g., [16–23]),
mostly under the context of quantitative information flow and anonymity systems.
The connections between different privacy notions have studied recently, e.g., [21, 22, 24, 25]. Alvim
et al. [24] showed that differential privacy implies a bound on the min-entropy leakage. du Pin Calmon,
Makhdoumi and Fawaz [21,22] showed the relationship between differential privacy, information privacy and
divergence privacy. Mir [25] pointed out that the mechanism that achieves the optimal rate–distortion also
guarantees a certain level of differential privacy. However, whether this differential privacy level is optimal
or how far it is from optimal was not answered in [25]. The fundamental connection between differential
privacy, mutual information and distortion is not yet clear. The connection between differential privacy and
mutual information has also been studied in the two-party setting [26], where mutual information is used as
the information cost for the protocol of communication between the two parities.
2 Model
Consider a database consisting of n rows, each of which corresponds to some sensitive information. For
example, each row could be an individual’s medical records. The database could also be a graph, where each
row indicates the existence of some edge. Suppose that rows take values from a domain D. Then Dn is the
set of all possible values of the database. Two databases, denoted by, x, x′ ∈ Dn, are said to be neighbors
and denoted as x ∼ x′ if they differ on exactly row. In this paper, we assume that the domain D is a finite
set and model a database as a discrete random variable X with alphabet Dn and probability mass function
(pmf) pX . Suppose |D| = m and let N = mn, where m is an integer and m ≥ 2. Then |Dn| = N . A
(randomized) mechanism M takes a database x as the input, and outputs a random variable M(x).
Definition 1 (Mechanism). A mechanism M is specified by an associated mapping φM : Dn → F , where
F is the set of multivariate cdf’s on some R ⊆ Rr. Taking database X as the input, the mechanism M
outputs a R-valued random variable Y with φM(x) as the multivariate conditional cdf of Y given X = x. 
In this paper, we focus on mechanisms M of which the range is the same as the alphabet of X, i.e.,
R = Dn. Then the output Y is also a discrete random variable with alphabet Dn. Denote the conditional
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pmf of Y given X = x defined by the cdf φM(x) as pY |X(· | x). Throughout this paper we use the following
basic notation. We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of nonnegative real numbers by R+, and the
set of nonnegative integers by N. Let R+ = R+ ∪ {+∞}.
2.1 Different Notions of Privacy
In addition to the output database Y, we assume that the adversary knows the prior distribution pX(x),
which represents the side information the adversary has, and the privacy-preserving mechanism M. The
three notions of privacy studied in this paper are defined next.
Definition 2 (Identifiability). A mechanism M satisfies -identifiability for some  ∈ R+ if for any pair of
neighboring elements x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y). (1)

Different from differential identifiability [14] and membership privacy [15], which are concerned with
whether a particular entity occurs in the database, the notion of identifiability considered here provides a
posteriori indistinguishability between any neighboring x and x′, thus preventing the whole database from
being identified. Note that this is an absolute level of indistinguishability, such that the adversary cannot
distinguish x and x′ based on the output database y, prior knowledge pX and the mechanism M.
Definition 3 (Differential Privacy [1, 2]). A mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy for some  ∈ R+
if for any pair of neighboring elements x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pY |X(y | x) ≤ epY |X(y | x′). (2)

In [1, 2], a mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy for some  ∈ R+ if for any pair of neighboring
elements x, x′ ∈ Dn, and any S ⊆ R,
Pr{Y ∈ S | X = x} ≤ e Pr{Y ∈ S | X = x′}, (3)
where the conditional probabilities Pr{Y ∈ S | X = x} and Pr{Y ∈ S | X = x′} are defined by the
multivariate conditional cdf’s φM(x) and φM(x′), respectively. In the case that the range R = Dn, which is
a discrete set, this is equivalent to the requirement (2). The differential privacy property of a mechanism is
fully characterized by the associated mapping. Given any particular database, a mechanismM provides the
same privacy guarantee regardless of the prior pX , as long as the associated mapping φM has been specified.
Note that the guarantee that the notion of differential privacy provides is a relative one, which ensures
that limited additional information of an individual is leaked due to the presence of this individual in the
database in addition to the knowledge that an adversary has known.
Definition 4 (Mutual-Information Privacy). A mechanism M satisfies -mutual-information privacy for
some  ∈ R+ if the mutual information between X and Y satisfies I(X;Y ) ≤ , where
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x,y∈Dn
pX,Y (x, y) log
pX,Y (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
. (4)

Mutual information is widely used to quantify information leakage in the literature, mostly under the
context of quantitative information flow and anonymity systems. Under our setting, the information leakage
we need to quantify is between the input database X and the output database Y . Note that the notion
of mutual information is an information theoretic notion of privacy, which measures the average amount of
information about X contained in Y. When X and Y are independent, I(X;Y ) = 0. The mutual information
is maximized and equal to H(X) when Y = X.
4
2.2 Distortion
In this paper, we measure the usefulness of a mechanism by the distortion between the database X and the
output Y , where smaller distortion yields greater usefulness. Consider the Hamming distance d : Dn×Dn →
N. Viewing elements in Dn as vectors of n rows, the distance d(x, x′) between two elements x, x′ ∈ Dn is
the number of rows they differ on. We define the distortion between X and Y to be the expected Hamming
distance
E[d(X,Y )] =
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y). (5)
The Hamming distance also characterizes the neighboring relation on Dn. Two elements x, x′ ∈ Dn are
neighbors if and only if d(x, x′) = 1.
2.3 Privacy–Distortion Function
A privacy–distortion pair (,D) is said to be achievable if there exists a mechanism M with output Y such
that M satisfies -privacy level and E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D. The privacy–distortion function ∗ : R+ → R+ is
defined by
∗(D) = inf{ : (,D) is achievable}, (6)
which is the smallest (best) privacy level given the distortion constraint E[d(X,Y )] ≤ D. We are only
interested in the range [0, n] for D since this is the meaningful range for distortion. The privacy–distortion
function depends on the prior pX , which reflects the impact of the prior on the privacy–distortion tradeoff. To
characterize the privacy–distortion function, we also consider the distortion–privacy function D∗ : R+ → R+
defined by
D∗() = inf{D : (,D) is achievable}, (7)
which is the smallest achievable distortion given privacy level .
In this paper we consider three different notions of privacy: identifiability, differential privacy and mutual-
information privacy, so we denote the privacy–distortion functions under these three notions by ∗i , 
∗
d and
∗m, respectively.
3 Identifiability versus Differential Privacy
In this section, we establish a fundamental connection between identifiability and differential privacy. Given
privacy level i and d, the minimum distortion level is the solution to the following optimization problems.
The Privacy–Distortion Problem under Identifiability (PD-I):
min
pX|Y , pY
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
subject to pX|Y (x | y) ≤ eipX|Y (x′ | y),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′, y ∈ Dn, (8)∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y) = 1, ∀y ∈ Dn, (9)
pX|Y (x | y) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn, (10)∑
y∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)pY (y) = pX(x),
∀x ∈ Dn,
(11)
pY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Dn. (12)
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Figure 2: The privacy–distortion function ∗i under identifiability and 
∗
d under differential privacy satisfy
∗i (D)− X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D) for D in some range.
The Privacy–Distortion Problem under Differential Privacy (PD-DP):
min
pY |X
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y)
subject to pY |X(y | x) ≤ edpY |X(y | x′),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′, y ∈ Dn, (13)∑
y∈Dn
pY |X(y | x) = 1, ∀x ∈ Dn, (14)
pY |X(y | x) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn. (15)
For convenience, we first define two constants X and ˜X that only depend on the prior pX . Let
X = max
x,x′∈Dn:x∼x′
ln
pX(x)
pX(x′)
, (16)
which is the maximum prior probability difference between two neighboring databases. For X to be finite,
the distribution pX needs to have full support on Dn, i.e., pX(x) > 0 for any x ∈ Dn. To define ˜X , note
that the prior pX puts some constraints on the posterior probabilities. We say {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} is
feasible if there exists a pmf pY such that it is the marginal pmf of Y . Let ˜X be the smallest  such that
the following posterior probabilities are feasible:
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn.
For any pX , ˜X is finite since when → +∞, the pmf pY = pX is the marginal pmf of Y . Finally we consider
the function
h−1(D) = ln
( n
D
− 1)+ ln(m− 1). (17)
Recall that ∗i (D) denotes the best identifiability level under a maximum distortion D, and 
∗
d(D) denotes
the best differential privacy level under a maximum distortion D. The connection between the privacy–
distortion functions ∗i and 
∗
d is established in the following theorem. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Theorem 1. For identifiability, the privacy–distortion function ∗i of a database X with X < +∞ satisfies{
∗i (D) = h
−1(D), 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X),
∗i (D) ≥ max{h−1(D), X}, h(˜X) < D ≤ n.
(18)
For differential privacy, the privacy–distortion function ∗d of a database X satisfies the following bounds for
any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n:
max{h−1(D)− X , 0} ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ max{h−1(D), 0}. (19)

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Figure 3: Both PD-I and PD-DP boil down to R-PD through different relaxations.
From the theorem above, we can see that 0 ≤ ∗i (D) − ∗d(D) ≤ X when 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X). The lemmas
needed in the proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix. Here we give a sketch of the proof, which
consists of the following key steps:
• The first key step is to show that both PD-I and PD-DP, through (respective) relaxations as shown in
Figure 3, boil down to the same optimization problem.
Relaxed Privacy–Distortion (R-PD):
min
pX|Y , pY
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
subject to pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y),
∀x, x′ ∈ Dn : x ∼ x′, y ∈ Dn, (20)∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y) = 1, ∀y ∈ Dn, (21)
pX|Y (x | y) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn, (22)∑
y∈Dn
pY (y) = 1, (23)
pY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Dn. (24)
Relaxing the constraint (11) in PD-I to the constraint (23) gives R-PD. Now consider PD-DP. For any
neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn, pX(x) ≤ eXpX(x′) according to the definition of X , and a necessary condition
for the constraint (13) to be satisfied is
pX(x)pY |X(y | x) ≤ ed+XpX(x′)pY |X(y | x′). (25)
Therefore, replacing constraint (13) with (25) and letting  = d + X , we obtain R-PD. So R-PD can
be regarded as a relaxation of both PD-I and PD-DP.
• In Lemma 1, we prove that the minimum distortion of R-PD is D∗relaxed() = h(), which gives lower
bounds on the distortion–privacy functions under identifiability and under differential privacy. By the
connection between distortion–privacy function and privacy–distortion function, Lemma 2 shows that
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D) and ∗d(D) ≥ h−1(D)− X for any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n. Lemma 3 shows another lower
bound on ∗i , combining which with the lower bound in Lemma 2 gives the lower bound in Theorem 1.
• Consider the mechanism Ei specified by
pY |X(y | x) = pY (y)e
−d(x,y)
pX(x)
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (26)
where  ≥ ˜X and pY is the corresponding pmf of Y . Lemma 4 shows that the mechanism Ei guarantees
an identifiability level of  with distortion h() when  ≥ ˜X , which yields (18) when combining with
the lower bound above.
7
• Consider the mechanism Ed specified by the conditional probabilities
pY |X(y | x) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (27)
where  ≥ 0. This is the exponential mechanism with score function q = −d [27]. Lemma 5 shows that
the mechanism E satisfies -differential privacy with distortion h(), which provides the upper bound
in (19).
4 Identifiability versus Mutual-Information Privacy
In this section, we discuss the connection between identifiability and mutual-information privacy. Intuitively,
mutual information can be used to quantify the information about X by observing a correlated random vari-
able Y . Recall that the privacy–distortion function under mutual-information privacy denotes the smallest
achievable mutual information without exceeding a maximum distortion. Note that this formulation has the
same form as the formulation in the rate–distortion theory [28], and thus the privacy–distortion function
under mutual-information privacy is identical to the rate–distortion function in this setting. We will show
that identifiability and mutual-information privacy are consistent under the privacy–distortion framework in
the sense that given a maximum distortion D, there is a mechanism that minimizes the identifiability level
∗i (D) and also achieves the minimum mutual information, for some range of D.
It has been pointed out in [25] that the mechanism that achieves the optimal rate–distortion also guaran-
tees a certain level of differential privacy. However, whether this differential privacy level is optimal or how
far it is from optimal was not answered. Our result on the connection between identifiability and mutual-
information privacy indicates that given a maximum distortion D, there is a mechanism that achieves the
optimal rate–distortion and guarantees a differential privacy level  such that ∗d(D) ≤  ≤ ∗d(D) + X .
Given a maximum distortion D, the privacy–distortion function ∗m(D) for input X with pmf pX(·) is
given by the optimal value of the following convex optimization problem.
The Privacy and Distortion Problem under Mutual-Information Privacy (PD-MIP):
min
pY |X
I(X;Y )
subject to
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y) ≤ D, (28)∑
y∈Dn
pY |X(y | x) = 1, ∀x ∈ Dn, (29)
pY |X(y | x) ≥ 0, ∀x, y ∈ Dn. (30)
Theorem 2. For any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), the identifiability optimal mechanism Ei defined in (26) is
also mutual-information optimal. 
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian and the KKT conditions of the optimization problem PD-MIP. For any
0 ≤ D ≤ h(˜X), consider the conditional probabilities {pY |X(y | x), x, y ∈ Dn} in (26) under Ei with
 = h−1(D). Then it is easy to verify that {pY |X(y | x), x, y ∈ Dn} is primal feasible. Let λ = h−1(D),
µ(x) = pX(x) ln
[
pX(x)
(
1 + (m − 1)e−)n] with x ∈ Dn and η(x, y) = 0 with x, y ∈ Dn be the Lagrange
multipliers for (28), (29) and (30), respectively. Then these multipliers are dual feasible. The stationarity
condition pX(x) ln pY |X(y | x)−pX(x) ln pY (y)+λpX(x)d(x, y)+µ(x)−η(x, y) = 0 (derived in Appendix A)
and the complementary slackness condition are also satisfied. Therefore, the above (pY |X , λ, µ, η) satisfies
the KKT conditions of PD-MIP.
Slater’s condition holds for the problem PD-MIP since all the inequality constraints are affine [29]. By
convexity, the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality. Therefore the mechanism Ei with  = h−1(D)
also gives the smallest mutual information.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the relation between three different notions of privacy: identifiability, differ-
ential privacy and mutual-information privacy, where identifiability provides absolute indistinguishability,
differential privacy guarantees limited additional information leakage, and mutual information is an infor-
mation theoretic notion of privacy. Under a unified privacy–distortion framework, where the distortion is
defined to be the Hamming distance between the input and output databases, we established some fun-
damental connections between these three privacy notions. Given a maximum distortion D within some
range, the smallest identifiability level ∗i (D) and the smallest differential privacy level 
∗
d(D) are proved to
satisfy ∗i (D) − X ≤ ∗d(D) ≤ ∗i (D), where X is a constant depending on the distribution of the original
database, and is equal to zero when the distribution is uniform. Furthermore, we showed that identifia-
bility and mutual-information privacy are consistent in the sense that given the same maximum distortion
D within some range, there is a mechanism that simultaneously optimizes the identifiability level and the
mutual-information privacy.
Our findings in this study reveal some fundamental connections between the three notions of privacy.
With these three notions of privacy being defined, many interesting issues deserve further attention. For
example, in some cases, the prior pX is imperfect, and it is natural to ask how we can protect privacy with
robustness over the prior distribution. Some other interesting directions include the generalization from
“pairwise” privacy to “group” privacy, which arises from the pairwise requirements that both identifiability
and differential privacy impose on neighboring databases. The connections between membership privacy and
these three notions of privacy also need to be explored, since membership privacy has been proposed as a
unifying framework for privacy definitions.
A Proofs
Lemma 1. The minimum distortion D∗relaxed() of the relaxed optimization problem R-PD satisfies
D∗relaxed() = h(), (31)
where
h() =
n
1 + e

m−1
. (32)
Proof. We first prove the following claim, which gives a lower bound on the minimum distortion D∗relaxed().
Claim. Any feasible solution {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} of R-PD satisfies∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) ≥ h(). (33)
Proof of the Claim. Consider any feasible {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn}. For any y ∈ Dn and any integer l
with 0 ≤ l ≤ n, let Nl(y) be the set of elements with distance l to y, i.e.,
Nl(y) = {v ∈ Dn : d(v, y) = l}. (34)
Denote Pl = Pr{X ∈ Nl(y) | Y = y}. Then∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) =
n∑
l=0
lPl.
We first derive a lower bound on Pn. For any u ∈ Nl−1(y), N1(u) ∩ Nl(y) consists of the neighbors of u
that are in Nl(y). By the constraint (20), for any v ∈ N1(u) ∩Nl(y),
pX|Y (u | y) ≤ epX|Y (v | y). (35)
Each u ∈ Nl−1(y) has n− (l − 1) rows that are the same with the corresponding rows of y. Each neighbor
of u in Nl(y) can be obtained by changing one of these n− (l− 1) rows to a different element in D, which is
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left with m− 1 choices. Therefore, each u ∈ Nl−1(y) has (n− l + 1)(m− 1) neighbors in Nl(y). By similar
arguments, each v ∈ Nl(y) has l neighbors inNl−1(y). Taking summation of (35) over u ∈ Nl−1(y), v ∈ Nl(y)
with u ∼ v yields ∑
u∈Nl−1(y)
(n− l + 1)(m− 1)pX|Y (u | y)
≤ e
∑
u∈Nl−1(y)
∑
v∈N1(u)∩Nl(y)
pX|Y (v | y).
Thus
(n− l + 1)(m− 1)Pl−1
≤ e
∑
v∈Nl(y)
∑
u∈N1(v)∩Nl−1(y)
pX|Y (v | y) (36)
= elPl. (37)
Recall that Nl , |Nl(x)| =
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)l. Then by (37) we obtain that, for any l with 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
Pl−1
Nl−1
≤ Pl
Nl
e.
As a consequence, for any l with 0 ≤ l ≤ n,
Pl ≤ Nl
Nn
e(n−l)Pn. (38)
Since
∑n
l=0 Pl = 1, taking summation over l in (38) yields
1 ≤ Pn 1
Nne−n
n∑
l=0
Nle
−l
= Pn
(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
Nne−n
,
i.e.,
Pn ≥ Nne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
This lower bound on Pn gives the following lower bound:
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥
n∑
l=0
l
(
Pl + a
Nle
−l∑n−1
k=0 Nke
−k
)
+
nNne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n ,
where a = Pn − Nne−n(
1+(m−1)e−
)n .
Consider the following optimization problem:
min
n−1∑
l=0
lQl
subject to Ql ≥ 0, l = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1,
Ql−1
Nl−1
≤ Ql
Nl
e, l = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
n−1∑
l=0
Ql = 1− Nne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
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Suppose the optimal solution of this problem is {Q∗0, Q∗1, . . . , Q∗n−1}. Then
n−1∑
l=0
l
(
Pl + a
Nle
−l∑n−1
k=0 Nke
−k
)
≥
n−1∑
l=0
lQ∗l
as
{
Pl + a
Nle
−l∑n−1
k=0 Nke
−k , l = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1
}
is a feasible solution. Therefore,
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥
n−1∑
l=0
lQ∗l +
nNne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Similar to {Pl, l = 0, . . . , n}, {Q∗l , l = 0, . . . , n− 1} satisfies
Q∗l ≤
Nl
Nn−1
e(n−1−l)Q∗n−1. (39)
Since
∑n−1
l=0 Q
∗
l = 1− Nne
−n(
1+(m−1)e−
)n , taking summation over l in (39) yields
Q∗n−1 ≥
Nn−1e−(n−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Using similar arguments we have
n−1∑
l=0
lQ∗l ≥
n−2∑
l=0
lC∗l +
(n− 1)Nn−1e−(n−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n ,
where {C∗l , l = 0, . . . , n− 2} is the optimal solution of
min
n−2∑
l=0
lCl
subject to Cl ≥ 0, l = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2,
Cl−1
Nl−1
≤ Cl
Nl
e, l = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2,
n−2∑
l=0
Cl = 1− Nn−1e
−(n−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
− Nne
−n(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
Continue this procedure we obtain
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥
n∑
l=0
lNle
−(n−l)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n = n1 + em−1 = h().
Therefore, for any feasible {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn},∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) =
n∑
l=0
lPl ≥ h(),
which completes the proof of the claim.
By this claim, any feasible solution satisfies∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) ≥ h().
Therefore
D∗relaxed() ≥ h(). (40)
Next we prove the following claim, which gives an upper bound on the minimum distortion D∗relaxed().
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Claim. Consider
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n , x, y ∈ Dn, (41)
and any {pY (y), y ∈ Dn} with ∑
y∈Dn
pY (y) = 1, pY (y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Dn.
Then {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} and {pY (y), y ∈ Dn} form a feasible solution of R-PD, and∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) = h(). (42)
Proof of the Claim. Obviously the considered {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} and {pY (y), y ∈ Dn} satisfy
constraints (22)–(24). Therefore to prove the feasibility, we are left with constraint (20) and (21). We first
verify constraint (20). Consider any pair of neighboring elements x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn. Then by the
triangle inequality,
d(x, y) ≤ d(x′, y)− d(x′, x) = d(x′, y)− 1.
Therefore,
pX|Y (x | y) = e
−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
≤ e
−(d(x′,y)−1)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
= epX|Y (x′ | y).
Next we verify constraint (21). For any y ∈ Dn and any integer l with 0 ≤ l ≤ n, let Nl(x) be the set of
elements with distance l to y as defined in (34). Then it is easy to see that Nl , |Nl(y)| =
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)l, and
for any y ∈ Dn,
Dn =
n⋃
l=0
Nl(y).
Therefore, for any y ∈ Dn, ∑
x∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)
=
∑
x∈Dn
e−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
=
1(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
n∑
l=0
∑
x∈Nl(y)
e−d(x,y)
=
1(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n
n∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)le−l
= 1.
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With feasibility verified, we can proceed to calculate the distortion. Let g = 1 + (m− 1)e−. Then∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y)
=
1
(g)n
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
n∑
l=0
∑
x∈Nl(y)
e−d(x,y)d(x, y)
=
1
(g)n
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
n∑
l=0
(
n
l
)
(m− 1)le−ll
=
n(m− 1)e−(1 + (m− 1)e−)n−1
(g)n
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)
=
n
1 + e

m−1
= h(),
which completes the proof of the claim.
By this claim, there exists a feasible solution such that∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pY (y)pX|Y (x | y)d(x, y) = h(),
which implies
D∗relaxed() ≤ h().
Combining this upper bound with the lower bound (40) gives
D∗relaxed() = h().
Lemma 2. The optimal value D∗relaxed() = h() of R-PD implies the following lower bounds for any D with
0 ≤ D ≤ n:
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D), (43)
∗d(D) ≥ max{h−1(D)− X , 0}. (44)
Proof. First we derive the lower bound on ∗i (D). Let δ be an arbitrary positive number. For any D with
0 ≤ D ≤ n, let D,δ = ∗i (D) + δ. Then by the definition of ∗i , we have that (D,δ, D) is achievable under
identifiability. Therefore
D ≥ D∗i (D,δ) ≥ D∗relaxed(D,δ) = h(D,δ),
where D∗i (·) is the optimal value of PD-I. Since h is a decreasing function, this implies that D,δ ≥ h−1(D).
Therefore
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D)− δ.
Letting δ → 0 yields
∗i (D) ≥ h−1(D).
Next we derive the lower bound on ∗d(D) using arguments similar to those in the proof of the lower
bound on ∗i (D). Let δ be an arbitrary positive number. For any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n, let D,δ = ∗d(D) + δ.
Then by the definition of ∗d, we have that (D,δ, D) is achievable under differential privacy. Therefore
D ≥ D∗d(D,δ) ≥ D∗relaxed(D,δ + X) = h(D,δ + X),
where D∗d(·) is the optimal value of PD-DP. Since h is a decreasing function, this implies that D,δ + X ≥
h−1(D). Therefore
∗d(D) ≥ h−1(D)− X − δ.
13
Letting δ → 0 yields
∗d(D) ≥ h−1(D)− X .
Since the privacy level is nonnegative, we obtain the lower bound in (44).
Lemma 3. The privacy–distortion function ∗i of a database X is bounded from below as
∗i (D) ≥ X (45)
for any D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n, where X is the constant defined in (16).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a D with 0 ≤ D ≤ n such that ∗i (D) < X . Let δ be
an arbitrary positive number with 0 < δ < X − ∗i (D), and let  = ∗i (D) + δ. Then  < X and (,D) is
achievable under identifiability. Consider the mechanism that achieves (,D). Then by the requirement of
identifiability, for any neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn and any y ∈ Dn,
pX|Y (x | y) ≤ epX|Y (x′ | y). (46)
Let pY (·) be the pmf of the output Y . Then pY (y) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ Dn. Therefore, multiplying both sides
of (46) by pY (y) and taking summation over y ∈ Dn yield∑
y∈Dn
pX|Y (x | y)pY (y) ≤
∑
y∈Dn
epX|Y (x′ | y)pY (y),
which implies
pX(x) ≤ epX(x′).
Then there do not exist neighboring x, x′ ∈ Dn with pX(x) = eXpX(x′) since  < X , which contradicts
with the definition of X in (16).
Lemma 4. For  ≥ ˜X , the mechanism Ei defined in (26) satisfies -identifiability, and the distortion of Ei
is given by E[d(X,Y )] = h().
Proof. Consider any  ≥ ˜X . Then under the mechanism Ei, the posterior probability for any x, y ∈ Dn is
given by
pX|Y (x | y) =
pY |X(y | x)pX(x)
pY (y)
=
e−d(x,y)(
1 + (m− 1)e−)n .
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, this {pX|Y (x | y), x, y ∈ Dn} and the corresponding {pY (y), y ∈ Dn}
form an optimal solution of the relaxed optimization problem R-PD. Following the same arguments as in
the proof of Lemma 1 we can conclude that Ei satisfies -identifiability, and the distortion of Ei is given by
E[d(X,Y )] = h().
Lemma 5. The mechanism Ed defined in (27) satisfies -differential privacy, and the distortion of Ed is
given by E[d(X,Y )] = h().
Proof. Under mechanism Ed, {pY |X(y | x), x, y ∈ Dn} has the same form as the posteriors under mechanism
Ei. Therefore still by similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 1, Ed satisfies -differential privacy, and
the distortion of Ed is given by E[d(X,Y )] = h().
Derivation of the Stationarity Condition
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The Lagrangian of the optimization problem PD-MIP can be written as
J({pY |X(y | x), x, y ∈ Dn})
=
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x) ln
pY |X(y | x)∑
x′∈Dn
pX(x
′)pY |X(y | x′)
+ λ
( ∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
pX(x)pY |X(y | x)d(x, y)−D
)
+
∑
x∈Dn
µ(x)
(∑
y∈Dn
pY |X(y | x)− 1
)
−
∑
x∈Dn
∑
y∈Dn
η(x, y) pY |X(y | x),
where λ, µ(x), η(x, y), x, y ∈ Dn are the Lagrangian multipliers. Consider the KKT conditions of this
optimization problem. The stationarity condition is given by
∂J
∂pY |X(y | x) = 0, x, y ∈ D
n,
which is equivalent to
pX(x) ln
pY |X(y | x)
pY (y)
+ λpX(x)d(x, y) + µ(x)− η(x, y) = 0, x, y ∈ Dn.
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